[SystemSafety] Spanish train crash

Tue Aug 6 12:16:33 CEST 2013

According to "La Voz de Galicia", the telephone call ended 11 seconds
before the train derailed. The driver activated the brakes 7 seconds before
the train derailed.

http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/galicia/2013/08/03/accidente-santiago-interventor-hizo-tres-llamadas-maquinista-durante-viaje/0003_201308G3P4991.htm

http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/galicia/2013/08/03/accidente-santiago-maquinista-activo-freno-solo-siete-segundos-descarrilar/0003_201308G3P2991.htm

It has been indicated by several newspapers that the testimony you mention
regarding the phone call was not the same as the initial testimony given by
the driver nor by the inspector. I don't have access to the statements, but
I understand that both never mentioned the phone call until a number of
days later.

http://www.larazon.es/detalle_normal/noticias/3198913/diez-claves-para-entender-el-accidente

Some reports claim that the driver never mentioned the phone call because
he did not consider it relevant at the time, others claim that he said that
he did not mention it because he "did not want to involve anyone".

http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/07/30/actualidad/1375214971_232262.html

It seems that the document you mention was a map.

Some of the judicial transcription is available here (in Spanish):

http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/07/30/actualidad/1375220863_784508.html

Given the quantity of information sources, I would rather not draw any
conclusions at this time.

Any opinions expressed are solely my own and do not express the views or
opinions of my employer.

Regards,

Myriam

2013/8/6 Matthew Squair <mattsquair at gmail.com>

> All,
>
> A Galician friend sent me this link. According to this source ADIF (the
> spanish administrator of state railways) has now installed additional ASFA
> beacons (balise) to the section of track at which the accident occurred.
>
>
> http://www.publico.es/461112/fomento-asume-que-tres-balizas-habrian-evitado-el-accidente-del-alvia
>
> The International Railway Journal also reports that the transition from
> high speed to conventional line where the accident occurred was only
> intended as a temporary link until the high speed line was extended towards
> A Coruna, although that extension has been deferred.
>
> Finally the driver's testimony indicates that immediately prior to the
> accident he was on the phone with the on-board ticket inspector (who had
> rung him) and they were discussing which station platform to stop at,
> testimony by the ticket inspector supports the drivers statements. Crew cab
> background noise retrieved from the recorder indicates the driver may also
> have been consulting a document of some kind.
>
> Regards,
>
>
> On Tue, Jul 30, 2013 at 1:57 AM, <
> peter.sheppard at uk.transport.bombardier.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> Chris,
>>
>> That was the point I was making, even following the application of
>> "technology" to Morpeth Curve (albeit a fairly crude AWS warning), there
>> were still derailments.
>>
>> At Southall AWS and ATP were both fitted, but turned off at the time of
>> the accident.
>>
>> At Ladbroke Grove, the train that passed the red signal had not been
>> fitted with ATP, but the HST approaching had (albeit having passed any
>> measures that may have applied the brakes).
>>
>> At Wembley there was a accident with a suburban unit running into the
>> rear of a freightliner train as a result of repetitive cancelling on the
>> AWS (AWS only discriminates between green and "not green")
>>
>> Regardless of technology, it is the human and degraded modes that must be
>> considered in all system designs.
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Peter
>> (Speaking for himself)
>>
>> Peter Sheppard
>> Senior Safety Engineer and Validator
>>
>> Mobile: +44 7920 247931
>>
>>
>> Please consider the environment before you print / Merci de penser à
>> l'environnement avant d'imprimer / Bitte denken Sie an die Umwelt bevor Sie
>> drucken
>>
>> Bombardier Transportation UK Ltd
>> Registered Office: Litchurch Lane, Derby, DE24 8AD, England
>> TEL +44 1332 344666, FAX +44 1332 266271
>> Registered in England
>> Registration No. 2235994
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *"Chris Dale" <chris.dale at scsc.org.uk>*
>> Sent by: systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
>> 29/07/2013 16:38
>> To
>> <systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>
>> cc
>>   Subject
>> Re: [SystemSafety] Spanish train crash
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Thank you, Peter.
>>
>> Surely the lesson of the Morpeth derailments is that speed limits on
>> tight curves need to be enforced technologically, not merely procedurally
>> by the imposition of speed limits.
>>
>> According to Prof. Roger Kemp of Lancaster University, quoted by MSN, the
>> accident in Spain occurred on a section of ‘half completed’ track that was
>> still being brought up to date with the safety standards of the European
>> Rail Traffic Management System, which would have prevented the train from
>> exceeding the speed on the section of track. *
>> http://news.uk.msn.com/world/why-spains-horror-train-crash-cant-happen-in-the-uk569032
>> *<http://news.uk.msn.com/world/why-spains-horror-train-crash-cant-happen-in-the-uk569032>
>>
>> If this is true, the driver should not be the only one under
>> investigation.
>>
>> Chris Dale
>> (also speaking for himself only)
>>
>> *From:* systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de [mailto:
>> systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] *On Behalf Of *
>> peter.sheppard at uk.transport.bombardier.com*
>> Sent:* 29 July 2013 13:35*
>> To:* systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de*
>> Subject:* Re: [SystemSafety] Spanish train crash
>>
>>
>> I have just one comment - "Morpeth" 1969, 1984, 1994!
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Peter
>> (Speaking on behalf of himself only)
>>
>> Peter Sheppard
>> Senior Safety Engineer and Validator
>>
>> Mobile: +44 7920 247931
>>
>>
>> Please consider the environment before you print / Merci de penser à
>> l'environnement avant d'imprimer / Bitte denken Sie an die Umwelt bevor Sie
>> drucken
>>
>> Bombardier Transportation UK Ltd
>> Registered Office: Litchurch Lane, Derby, DE24 8AD, England
>> TEL +44 1332 344666, FAX +44 1332 266271
>> Registered in England
>> Registration No. 2235994
>>
>>
>>
>> *
>> "Chris Dale" <**chris.dale at scsc.org.uk* <chris.dale at scsc.org.uk>*>*
>> Sent by: *systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de*<systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>
>> 29/07/2013 12:41
>>   To
>> <*systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de*<systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>
>> >
>> cc
>>   Subject
>> Re: [SystemSafety] Spanish train crash
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> PBL wrote:
>>
>> > 11. I read in the Observer (Sunday paper of the Guardian group) that the
>> driver
>> > has been arrested, arraigned in handcuffs before a judge, and charged
>> with
>> > multiple manslaughter.
>> >
>> > That is, of course, an excellent way to ensure that investigators (of
>> any
>> kind)
>> > obtain minimal useful information about any human factors at play in
>> this
>> > accident. Indeed, the article reports that he has received legal advice
>> not to
>> > make a statement to police.
>>
>> Hear, hear!
>>
>> If some technological failure caused the accident, we need to know.
>>
>> If some technology misled, confused or distracted the driver at a critical
>> moment, we need to know.
>>
>> If some technology that should have intervened was absent, switched off,
>> or
>> otherwise ineffective, we need to know.
>>
>> The (seemingly) media-led frenzy to find someone to blame is an obstacle
>> to
>> the prevention of future accidents. Even if the technology is not at
>> fault,
>> we should still be asking what would lead an experienced, well-qualified
>> driver to act (or not act) in the way he did. Then we have a chance of
>> improving things. We won't if the 'blame game' takes priority.
>>
>> Chris Dale
>> Safety-Critical Systems Club Meetings Co-ordinator
>> *
>> **chris.dale at scsc.org.uk* <chris.dale at scsc.org.uk>
>> Tel: +44 (0)1326 565758
>> Mobile: +44 (0)7904 056507*
>> **www.scsc.org.uk* <http://www.scsc.org.uk/>
>>
>> Director
>> Dale Research Ltd
>> 2 Reppersfield Row, Breage, Helston TR13 9PG
>> Registered in England and Wales no: 4937941
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
> --
> *Matthew Squair*
> *
> *
> Mob: +61 488770655
> Email: MattSquair at gmail.com
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