[SystemSafety] Qualifying SW as "proven in use" [Measuring Software]

Steve Tockey Steve.Tockey at construx.com
Mon Jul 1 19:26:59 CEST 2013


Martyn,

"most systems that use any COTS would be ruled out of safety-related applications."

As well they should be. If my safety depended on the quality of the software produced in Redmond, I'd be running in the opposite direction.

"We can't become an engineering profession in one step - but I'd like us to be clearly starting the journey."

I completely agree that it can't happen in one step. But maybe people aren't aware of how much work has already been done. The journey has started, IMHO.


-- steve



From: Martyn Thomas <martyn at thomas-associates.co.uk<mailto:martyn at thomas-associates.co.uk>>
Reply-To: "martyn at thomas-associates.co.uk<mailto:martyn at thomas-associates.co.uk>" <martyn at thomas-associates.co.uk<mailto:martyn at thomas-associates.co.uk>>
Date: Monday, July 1, 2013 10:21 AM
Cc: "systemsafety at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de<mailto:systemsafety at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>" <systemsafety at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de<mailto:systemsafety at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>>
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Qualifying SW as "proven in use" [Measuring Software]

I agree. And I'd like to see COTS software supplied with a statement of complexity, against some standardised metric.

But it's a huge change you are asking for: most systems that use any COTS would be ruled out of safety-related applications.

We can't become an engineering profession in one step - but I'd like us to be clearly starting the journey.

Martyn



On 01/07/2013 18:16, Steve Tockey wrote:

Martyn,
My preference would be that things like low cyclomatic complexity be considered basic standards of professional practice, well before one even started talking about a safety case. Software with ridiculous complexities shouldn't even be allowed to start making a safety case in the first place.


-- steve



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