[SystemSafety] Who applies risk acceptance principles - Part 2

peter.sheppard at uk.transport.bombardier.com peter.sheppard at uk.transport.bombardier.com
Tue Jun 4 15:00:37 CEST 2013


ERA are the European Rail Agency (not the UK consultants!). With the 
advent of the Common Safety Method, they (ERA) are attempting to harmonise 
the approach taken across Europe for rail safety so that cross acceptance 
of systems can become a simple reality (it's possible at the moment, but 
due to the disparity in the way that different countries/regimes operate, 
you almost end up writing a new safety case anyway!)

This is a document put out by the ERA for discussion.  There was a paper 
(Keynote) given at an IET Railway Assurance event earlier this year where 
this topic was covered.  I'll see if I can find the details and post them 
here.

Cheers

Peter

Peter Sheppard
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"SPRIGGS, John J" <John.SPRIGGS at nats.co.uk>
Sent by: systemsafety-bounces at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
04/06/2013 12:35

To
"'systemsafety at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de'" 
<systemsafety at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>
cc

Subject
Re: [SystemSafety] Who applies risk acceptance principles - Part 2







This looked sort of understandable when I thought ERA was either the UK 
company that has some involvement in aviation risk assessment or the Czech 
company that does ground based CNS equipment, because the targets are 
based on what was derived for large aeroplanes at least forty years ago.
I now find that this ERA is something to do with railways, so it would be 
interesting to see the Justifications for the targets set.
 
John
 
From: systemsafety-bounces at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de 
[mailto:systemsafety-bounces at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] On Behalf Of 
ECHARTE MELLADO JAVIER
Sent: 04 June 2013 12:08
To: M Mencke; systemsafety at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Who applies risk acceptance principles - Part 
2
 
Myriam,
There is a new ERA Report about Risk Acceptance,  involving a ?validation 
process?.
http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Pages/RAC-note-1-2013.aspx
Basically, this is the proposal:
The following design targets shall apply to failures of functions of 
technical systems:
(a) For a failure that has a typical credible potential to lead directly 
to an accident affecting a
group of people and resulting in fatalities and/or severe injuries and/or 
major damages to
the environment, the frequency of the failure of the function does not 
have to be reduced
further if it is demonstrated to be less than or equal to 10-9 failures 
per operating hour.
(b) For a failure that has a typical credible potential to lead directly 
to an accident affecting an
individual person and resulting in fatality and/or severe injury, the 
frequency of the failure of
the function does not have to be reduced further if it is demonstrated to 
be less than or
equal to 10-7 failures per operating hour.
(c) For a failure that has a typical credible potential to lead directly 
to an accident resulting in
one or more light injuries, the frequency of the failure of the function 
does not have to be
reduced further if it is demonstrated to be less than 10-5 failures per 
operating hour
 
The document includes some clarification and doubts, please read it before 
discussing it.
I think that it is better to define a proper risk matrix (adjusting the 
CENELEC 50126 one, for example). But in any case, the ?old paradigm of 
10e-9? do not make sense, in my opinion?
Javier Echarte
Altran Spain.
 
De: systemsafety-bounces at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de 
[mailto:systemsafety-bounces at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] En nombre de M 
Mencke
Enviado el: jueves, 20 de septiembre de 2012 10:53
Para: systemsafety at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
Asunto: [SystemSafety] Who applies risk acceptance principles - Part 2
 
Hello everybody,
 
A couple of months ago I started a thread under the subject "Who applies 
risk acceptance principles?", particularly in the railway field. With 
"who" I was referring to whether the client or the supplier should define 
what is a reasonable Tolerable Hazard Rate for a hazard associated and the 
risk associated with that hazard. Some people interpreted the question as 
"who" (in general) applies Probabilistic Risk Assessment. 
 
Recently I have found some further answers to that question, particularly 
since a report regarding the revision of EC 352/2009 has been published. 
It is named "ERA_REC_02-2012_SAF - Accompanying Report on revision of CSM 
on risk assessment.doc".
 
The report confirms what I already suspected - there aren't any harmonised 
Risk Acceptance Criteria for Technical Systems for Railway, except for 
failures of functions with potential for catastrophic failure (4.3.1). 
They are only applied in aviation, nuclear and maritime sectors (Section 
3.4.3).
 
I would recommend this report to anyone working in railway RAMS. Its title 
is "Agency report on the experience with the existing regulation (EC) 
No352/2009 on a common safety method on risk evaluation and assessment and 
on the revision of that regulation".
 
Kind Regards,
 
Myriam


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