[SystemSafety] Who applies risk acceptance principles - Part 2
peter.sheppard at uk.transport.bombardier.com
peter.sheppard at uk.transport.bombardier.com
Tue Jun 4 15:00:37 CEST 2013
ERA are the European Rail Agency (not the UK consultants!). With the
advent of the Common Safety Method, they (ERA) are attempting to harmonise
the approach taken across Europe for rail safety so that cross acceptance
of systems can become a simple reality (it's possible at the moment, but
due to the disparity in the way that different countries/regimes operate,
you almost end up writing a new safety case anyway!)
This is a document put out by the ERA for discussion. There was a paper
(Keynote) given at an IET Railway Assurance event earlier this year where
this topic was covered. I'll see if I can find the details and post them
here.
Cheers
Peter
Peter Sheppard
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"SPRIGGS, John J" <John.SPRIGGS at nats.co.uk>
Sent by: systemsafety-bounces at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
04/06/2013 12:35
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"'systemsafety at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de'"
<systemsafety at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>
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Re: [SystemSafety] Who applies risk acceptance principles - Part 2
This looked sort of understandable when I thought ERA was either the UK
company that has some involvement in aviation risk assessment or the Czech
company that does ground based CNS equipment, because the targets are
based on what was derived for large aeroplanes at least forty years ago.
I now find that this ERA is something to do with railways, so it would be
interesting to see the Justifications for the targets set.
John
From: systemsafety-bounces at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
[mailto:systemsafety-bounces at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] On Behalf Of
ECHARTE MELLADO JAVIER
Sent: 04 June 2013 12:08
To: M Mencke; systemsafety at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Who applies risk acceptance principles - Part
2
Myriam,
There is a new ERA Report about Risk Acceptance, involving a ?validation
process?.
http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Pages/RAC-note-1-2013.aspx
Basically, this is the proposal:
The following design targets shall apply to failures of functions of
technical systems:
(a) For a failure that has a typical credible potential to lead directly
to an accident affecting a
group of people and resulting in fatalities and/or severe injuries and/or
major damages to
the environment, the frequency of the failure of the function does not
have to be reduced
further if it is demonstrated to be less than or equal to 10-9 failures
per operating hour.
(b) For a failure that has a typical credible potential to lead directly
to an accident affecting an
individual person and resulting in fatality and/or severe injury, the
frequency of the failure of
the function does not have to be reduced further if it is demonstrated to
be less than or
equal to 10-7 failures per operating hour.
(c) For a failure that has a typical credible potential to lead directly
to an accident resulting in
one or more light injuries, the frequency of the failure of the function
does not have to be
reduced further if it is demonstrated to be less than 10-5 failures per
operating hour
The document includes some clarification and doubts, please read it before
discussing it.
I think that it is better to define a proper risk matrix (adjusting the
CENELEC 50126 one, for example). But in any case, the ?old paradigm of
10e-9? do not make sense, in my opinion?
Javier Echarte
Altran Spain.
De: systemsafety-bounces at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
[mailto:systemsafety-bounces at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] En nombre de M
Mencke
Enviado el: jueves, 20 de septiembre de 2012 10:53
Para: systemsafety at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
Asunto: [SystemSafety] Who applies risk acceptance principles - Part 2
Hello everybody,
A couple of months ago I started a thread under the subject "Who applies
risk acceptance principles?", particularly in the railway field. With
"who" I was referring to whether the client or the supplier should define
what is a reasonable Tolerable Hazard Rate for a hazard associated and the
risk associated with that hazard. Some people interpreted the question as
"who" (in general) applies Probabilistic Risk Assessment.
Recently I have found some further answers to that question, particularly
since a report regarding the revision of EC 352/2009 has been published.
It is named "ERA_REC_02-2012_SAF - Accompanying Report on revision of CSM
on risk assessment.doc".
The report confirms what I already suspected - there aren't any harmonised
Risk Acceptance Criteria for Technical Systems for Railway, except for
failures of functions with potential for catastrophic failure (4.3.1).
They are only applied in aviation, nuclear and maritime sectors (Section
3.4.3).
I would recommend this report to anyone working in railway RAMS. Its title
is "Agency report on the experience with the existing regulation (EC)
No352/2009 on a common safety method on risk evaluation and assessment and
on the revision of that regulation".
Kind Regards,
Myriam
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