[SystemSafety] Autonomous Vehicles and "Hacking" Threats

[Peter Bernard Ladkin]

Dewi Daniels, who did much of the code inspection on this project I understand, is on this list.

For an unquantified list of what was discovered see slides 16-20 of
http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Talks/LadkinIETSysSafe2012.pdf

PBL

On 2014-11-22 23:30 , Martyn Thomas wrote:
> I think that his numbers are just the discovered anomalies. 
> 
> On 22 Nov 2014, at 22:03, Brent Kimberley <brent_kimberley at rogers.com
> <mailto:brent_kimberley at rogers.com>> wrote:
> 
>> How does Andy et al estimate the volume of undiscovered anomalies?
>>
>> On Saturday, November 22, 2014 10:47 AM, Martyn Thomas <martyn at thomas-associates.co.uk
>> <mailto:martyn at thomas-associates.co.uk>> wrote:
>>  
>> On 21/11/2014 16:38, Stefan Winter wrote:
>>> I had hoped for some better estimate of defect densities for the latter. The best approximation I
>>> had come up with so far is the product of "lines of code in a modern car" (100 million for a
>>> premium car in 2009) and "defect count per line of code in really critical software" (10^^-4 ). I
>>> had taken these numbers from an IEEE spectrum publication and a short paper from Gerard Holzmann,
>>> hoping that critical NASA software contains in average less bugs than common automotive code and
>>> the calculation, hence, gives me a conservative estimate. If anyone has a better idea or wants to
>>> share more accurate numbers, please let me know. :-) 
>>
>> Andy German's Crosstalk article
>> (http://www.crosstalkonline.org/storage/issue-archives/2003/200311/200311-0-Issue.pdf) decribed
>> the analysis of a range of software in a military aircraft. He reported a range of "anomaly"
>> densities, ranging from 4/KLoC to 250/KLoC.



Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Faculty of Technology, University of Bielefeld, 33594 Bielefeld, Germany
Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319  www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de