[SystemSafety] Chicago controller halts Delta jet's near-miss....
Les Chambers
les at chambers.com.au
Mon Jun 29 01:28:30 CEST 2015
Peter
Can I clarify your assertion? (This is a message [3] style communication)
Do your words below assert that a pilot (as "enshrined in most countries'
law ") is empowered to take off without clearance from ATC?
Les
-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Bernard Ladkin [mailto:ladkin at rvs.uni-bielefeld.de]
Sent: Saturday, June 27, 2015 5:51 PM
To: Les Chambers
Cc: systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Chicago controller halts Delta jet's
near-miss....
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Les,
there are a few things wrong with your conception of ATC-aircraft relations.
The major one is
On 2015-06-27 08:48 , Les Chambers wrote:
> ATC/pilot take off protocol is a master slave protocol.
Most definitely it is not.
ATC clears airspace for the aircraft, and communicates which airspace is
cleared. The aircraft
acknowledges the clearance if it intends to fly according to it, and rejects
it if not. The
captain/commander of the aircraft is the sole authority over the conduct of
the flight, and that
is enshrined in most countries' law.
That said, decisions on either side may be questioned, as may failure to
follow a correctly
acknowledged clearance, or to communicate flown deviations from the
clearance.
There is 80+ years of development, experience and law behind all this. It is
pretty robust.
Airproxes are at the 10^6 level or less per movement, and the large majority
of those are with
aircraft that are not under positive control (that is, are flying in
airspace nominally cleared
for them by ATC). I believe a significant proportion of those which occur
under positive control
of both aircraft involve aircraft not flying their clearance. That was the
case in the Midway
incident.
I understand it's worthwhile to investigate incidents and what they might
say about operations,
including the protocols. GB, for example, has a Board that does that and
reports regularly, and
other ANSPs have their equivalents. It's helpful to know the state of the
practice!
PBL
Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Faculty of Technology, University of Bielefeld,
33594 Bielefeld, Germany
Je suis Charlie
Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319 www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de
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