[SystemSafety] Degraded software performance [diverged from Fault, Failure and Reliability Again]

DREW Rae d.rae at griffith.edu.au
Wed Mar 4 18:34:06 CET 2015


Nick,
I think you've reversed the point I was making, and then disagreed with the
opposite of what I was saying. What I really should have done is used
"computer system reliability" and refused to buy into the hardware/software
demarkation issue.

I disagree with claiming software rates for software regardless of whether
they are carefully concocted statistical estimates, or "software doesn't
fail". BOTH rely on making some arbitrary distinction between what is
software, and what is hardware. Whoever makes that distinction, where-ever
they make it, has an obligation to state clear assumptions about the other
side of the distinction, and have grounds for believing those assumptions
to be realistic.

You want to say that each of my failure modes for software "is a hardware
issue". Fine. But you don't want to make claims for software reliability
either. If you're not going to make a claim for reliability, any
distinction between software and hardware you want to create is fine by me.
Anyone who wants to claim either hardware or software reliability though,
and also wants to make a distinction between "software issues" and
"hardware issues", needs to consider both sides of the distinction.

If someone wants to say "the processor that the software runs on is not
software", then their standard needs to specifically address how they'll
make sure that your software requirements consider the aging of the
processor. If they want to say that changes in the input profile for the
software are not a software issue, then they need to go back to software
engineering school, because there's no universe in which a changed pattern
of inputs does not change the probability of an incorrect output.

On the plus side, if you'll let me characterise your message as a strawman
(instead of an honest misinterpretation of intent, which I'm sure it was) I
can complete my mailing list fallacy bingo card. We've already had
arguments from antiquity, argument from authority, "is" equals "ought",
equivocation, false equivalence, and not understanding the difference
between false and falsifiable. I don't think we've had anyone blatantly
misrepresent anyone else's position though.

Drew

My safety podcast: disastercast.co.uk
My mobile (from October 6th): 0450 161 361

On 4 March 2015 at 16:25, Nick Tudor <njt at tudorassoc.com> wrote:

> In line responses Andrew:
>
> On Wednesday, 4 March 2015, DREW Rae <d.rae at griffith.edu.au> wrote:
>
>> Michael,
>> I need to give more than one example, because the point is general,
>> rather than specific to the individual causes. In each case the cumulative
>> probability of software failure increases over time.
>>
>
> >>if you can determine the wear out mechanism for software I would agree,
> but you can't, so I don't.
>
> 1) Damage to the instruction set
>> e.g. the physical record of the instructions on a storage medium changes
>> very specific e.g. bit flip on a magnetic storage device holding the
>> executable files
>>
>
>
>> >>this is a hardware issue.
>>
>
>
>> 2) Increased unreliability of the physical execution environment
>> e.g. an increased rate of processor errors
>> very specific e.g. dust accumulates on part of the processor card, making
>> it run hot and produce calculation errors
>> >> this too is hardware.
>> 3) Increased unreliability of input hardware
>> e.g. software is required to detect and respond correctly to an increased
>> rate and variety of sensor failure combinations
>> Note: This is the one that challenges "but we're running the software in
>> exactly the same hardware environment". Hardware environments change as
>> they get older.
>>
>> >>ditto
>>
>
>
>> 4) Software accumulates information during runtime
>> e.g. a count of elapsed time
>> e.g. increasing volume of stored data
>> e.g. memory leak
>> >>bad requirements or/and bad verification.
>> NB1: In all of these cases I've heard arguments "that's not the software,
>> that's X". Those arguments are only relevant if you can control for X when
>> collecting data for software reliability calculation. Software without an
>> execution environment is a design. It "never fails" in the way that _no_
>> design fails. When it does fail, it is subject to the same degredation over
>> time as any physical implementation
>>
>
> >> there is no such thing as software reliability so don't use maths (or
> rather statistics and claim they are maths) inappropriately.
>
>>
>> NB2: I'm not claiming that failure due to physical degredation is
>> significant compared to failure due to errors in the original instructions.
>> I'm saying that we don't know, and that not knowing becomes a big issue
>> once we've tested to the point of not finding errors in the original
>> instructions. At that point, absent evidence to the contrary, we should be
>> assuming that physical degredation is signficant.
>>
>> >>. No one (I hope) denies that hardware effects may influence software
>> calculations. Still doesn't mean that the maths, er Statistics are the
>> right tool for the job.
>>
>
>
>
>
>> Drew
>>
>> On 4 March 2015 at 12:27, Michael J. Pont <M.Pont at safetty.net> wrote:
>>
>>> Drew,
>>>
>>> “The underlying point holds, that software _can_ exhibit degraded
>>> performance over time.”
>>>
>>> Can you please give me a simple example of what you mean by this.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>>
>>> Michael.
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> The System Safety Mailing List
>>> systemsafety at TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE
>>>
>>
>>
>
> --
> Nick Tudor
> Tudor Associates Ltd
> Mobile: +44(0)7412 074654
> www.tudorassoc.com
>
> *77 Barnards Green Road*
> *Malvern*
> *Worcestershire*
> *WR14 3LR*
> *Company No. 07642673*
> *VAT No:116495996*
>
> *www.aeronautique-associates.com <http://www.aeronautique-associates.com>*
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <https://lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de/mailman/private/systemsafety/attachments/20150304/1c153ca7/attachment.html>


More information about the systemsafety mailing list