[SystemSafety] COTS display certification

[Matthew Squair]

There's also the example Nancy Leveson gives in Safeware of the JA37B autopilot where data structure complexity was deliberately used to as a way to keep control structure simple. 

Matthew Squair

MIEAust, CPEng
Mob: +61 488770655
Email; Mattsquair at gmail.com
Web: http://criticaluncertainties.com

> On 29 Jul 2016, at 9:15 PM, Martyn Thomas <martyn at thomas-associates.co.uk> wrote:
> 
> It also has a great Appendix describing accidents that had erroneous
> data as one causal factor. I recommend reading it.
> 
> Martyn
> 
>> On 29/07/2016 12:12, paul_e.bennett at topmail.co.uk wrote:
>>> On 29/07/2016 at 11:44 AM, "Peter Bernard Ladkin" <ladkin at rvs.uni-bielefeld.de> wrote:
>>> 
>>> So what's right and wrong with the Data Safety document? 
>>> http://scsc.org.uk/p130 There has been zero
>>> discussion of it here.
>> That document is thought provoking and, while it may not be a perfect 
>> guide, it does get one thinking about data and its integrity while you
>> are designing your overall system architecture then on down into the
>> nitty-gritty detail. It may be a worthwhile beginning to having a standard
>> on Data Integrity that can be merged into the Safety and Security 
>> Standards
>> 
>> Regards
>> 
>> Paul E. Bennett IEng MIET
>> Systems Engineer
> 
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