[SystemSafety] Australian System Safety Conference 2018, May 23 to 25, Melbourne

[Les Chambers]

Gareth
Thanks for that. I have a real-world case study in support. I may have told this story before on this list but it's worthwhile repeating:
A board member of a very large chemical processing company decides to do an ad hoc audit of safety awareness. He turns up in an ethylene plant control room , approaches an operator, takes him outside, points at a flange on a six inch ethylene line in a pipe rack 30 feet above the ground.
" what would you do if that flange cracked and ethylene poured all over the deck" he said.
"Well sir" answered the operator, "unless there is a shut off valve in the car park, NOTHING!"

Les

> On 9 Dec 2017, at 2:49 pm, Gareth Lock <gareth at humaninthesystem.co.uk> wrote:
> 
> Safety culture is not some standalone part of the culture of the business - it is embedded part of it.
> 
> However, safety is just one priority that needs to be managed by operators at the sharp end in real time given competing goals. Where it is really effective is where the management recognise this constant battle and will support anyone within the team/organisation who says ‘stop’ or challenges the situation. A company can have one culture, but each location and department can have a different one. You’d hope they are aligned, but in many cases they are not.
> 
> In terms of being able to physically incapable of committing an unsafe act (a violation is allegedly intentional) Hale and Borys (2013) wrote the following which indicates the pure are not as common as we would hope.
> 
> “Hudson et al. (2000) also make a classification of those feeling comfortable with violation as ‘wolves’, and those not as ‘sheep’ and relates this to the actual violations in a study in the offshore oil industry. They found that 22% of the workforce were not inclined to violate and had not done so (sheep in sheep’s clothing), 30% were inclined to and had already done so (wolves in wolves’ clothing), 14% were not inclined to but had (in their eyes exceptionally) done so (sheep in wolves’ clothing), whilst 34% were comfortable with violation but had not (yet) had occasion to (wolves in sheep’s clothing). He advocates (see also Energy Institute, 2008) keeping the wolves at bay by involving them in planning and communication and the rewriting of procedures they are tempted to violate, and measures to provide explicit authorisation to deviate that keeps management and supervision in the loop. For the sheep, who tend to follow   rules   even   unthinkingly,   he   advocates   a   high   quality   of procedure, so that this unthinkingness does not lead them into error.”
> 
> and Denham Phipps (2008) looked at conditions for rule-breaking in anaesthesia.
> 
> “Several factors influencing anaesthetic violations were identified. These include the nature of the rule, the anaesthetist (both as an individual and as a professional group) and the situation. Implications for the understanding and management of human reliability issues within an organisation are discussed. This study provides an insight into procedural violations, which pose a threat to organisational safety but are distinct from human errors.”
> 
> As Les highlights, the frontline is a great place to see the balance between Work As Imagined an Work As Done taking place.
> 
> Regards
> 
> Gareth Lock
> Director
> 
> M: +44 7966 483832
> E: gareth at humaninthesystem.co.uk
> W: http://www.humaninthesystem.co.uk
> T: @HumaninSystem
> 
> Skype: gloc_1002
> WhatsApp: +44 7966 483832
> 
> International speaker on human factors and non-technical skills
> Published specialist on non-technical skills - https://www.humanfactors.academy/blog/sticky-published-articles
> 
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> 
>> On 9 Dec 2017, at 0:40, Les Chambers wrote:
>> 
>> Peter and Fredrik
>> Given that culture is often defined as a shared belief system I disagree that it's affect is indirect. The whole purpose of developing a safety culture is to directly influence peoples activities at the coalface on a day to day basis.
>> An actor imbued with a strong safety related belief system will not walk past a safety hazard and is physically incapable of committing an unsafe act.
>> As for Peters prose I share your confusion.
>> Peter, imagine yourself using those words in front of a room full of operators – aircraft operators, plant operators, practical people who need specific guidance and motivation. The thing I love about these people is they are smart , dependable and Armed with finely tuned BS sniffers. Being around them keeps you grounded, it's good for the soul. So my advice to you is forget about academic seminars. Spend more time in control rooms and cockpits. You might learn something.
>> 
>> Les
>> 
>> 
>>> On 8 Dec 2017, at 8:59 pm, Fredrik Asplund <fasplund at kth.se> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Given that influence by culture is always indirect I am not sure that definition of "depends" is very useful in the context, but sure - then I understand what you mean.
>>> Sincerely,
>>> / Fredrik
>>> 
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: systemsafety [mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] On Behalf Of Peter Bernard Ladkin
>>> Sent: den 8 december 2017 10:31
>>> To: The System Safety List
>>> Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Australian System Safety Conference 2018, May 23 to 25, Melbourne
>>> 
>>> On 2017-12-08 10:08 , Fredrik Asplund wrote:
>>>>> Whether the braking system on my bicycle is dependable is prima facie a technical engineering.
>>>>> issue. It has two aspects: (a) whether the design and implementation
>>>>> of the system makes it effective and highly reliable; (b) whether I maintain it appropriately.
>>>>> (a) is not at all cultural.
>>>> 
>>>> I am probably misunderstanding some part of the argument. How is (a) not dependent on the culture of the bike manufacturer?
>>> 
>>> The same way in which the correct proof of Fermat's Last Theorem is not dependent upon the psychology of Andrew Wiles and Richard Taylor and the culture which nourishes them and which enables them to think about it to the exclusion of almost anything else for many hours per day.
>>> 
>>> The same way in which the five-sigma evidence of the existence of the Higgs boson is not dependent upon the organisational culture of CERN.
>>> 
>>> Whether it exists is dependent on cultural factors. When it exists, its properties (for my bicycle brakes, physical; for the proof, mathematical and logical; for the evidence, statistical) are not necessarily dependent on any cultural factors at all.
>>> 
>>> PBL
>>> 
>>> Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bielefeld, Germany MoreInCommon Je suis Charlie
>>> Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319  www.rvs-bi.de
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
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