[SystemSafety] Koopman replies to concerns over Toyota UA case

Matthew Squair mattsquair at gmail.com
Sat Dec 30 12:29:07 CET 2017


Going back to the Toyota software case itself I think we can also
reasonably conclude that there were (at least) two basic principles that
the design violated. I took a stab at discussing why in the link below.

https://criticaluncertainties.com/2013/11/11/toyota-and-the-sphagetti-monster/

On 30 December 2017 at 5:32:38 am, Peter Bernard Ladkin (ladkin at causalis.com)
wrote:

> On 2017-12-30 01:51 , Matthew Squair wrote:
>
> I read David’s piece, and came away thinking oh dear what a special
> snowflake.
>
>
> There is no doubt that Cummings's arguments are poor. The question arises
> why someone of his
> experience might publish them (Phil mentions a plausible reason in his
> rebuttal).
>
> I summarise them and make some observations of my own at
>
> https://abnormaldistribution.org/index.php/2017/12/30/david-cummings-on-phil-koopmanmichael-barrs-unintended-acceleration-testimony/
>
>
> PBL
>
> Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bielefeld, Germany
> MoreInCommon
> Je suis Charlie
> Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319 www.rvs-bi.de
>
>
>
>
>
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