[SystemSafety] Koopman replies to concerns over Toyota UA case

[paul_e.bennett at topmail.co.uk]

On 30/12/2017 at 7:33 PM, "Matthew Squair" <mattsquair at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>Hi Derek,
>
>I agree, relying purely on McCabes metric as evidence would be 
>unwise, even
>for a forensic exercise.

Specifying a McCabe Code Complexity limit for individual software
components is, in my eyes, more of a trigger to begin asking the questions
that need to be asked. If the development policy set the MCC at say 9, then
any component submitted for review with a number above that should begin
to get questions asked.

I have a very nice graph which correlates the required effort in hours to do
the test of a software component at various MCC's. Considering that each
software component's review includes a full Fagan Inspection, a Functional
Test and a Limitations Test, and that the higher the MCC value expenonetially
more time is required to thoroughly review the component.

However, some specifications could do with being measured with McCabe to
guide reduction of the inherent complexity specified into a project in the first
place.


Regards

Paul E. Bennett IEng MIET
Systems Engineer
Lunar Mission One Ambassador
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