[SystemSafety] A Fire Code for Software?

Andy Ashworth andy at the-ashworths.org
Thu Mar 8 13:57:33 CET 2018


	
		
		
	
		
		The line was meant to be in service in May 2018... this has been pushed out to Nov 2018. There is major effort being expended to develop a post-design design safety case and retrofit design requirements into the process. An independent safety auditor was engaged by the client very late in the project and identified shortcomings... an external person with no engineering or safety credentials was assigned to manage safety process compliance. Since I removed myself from the project for the sake of my health, I cannot comment further about current status of the project and or its conformance to safety process requirements.
Andy

		

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From: Martyn Thomas <martyn at thomas-associates.co.uk>
Sent: Thursday, March 8, 2018 08:46
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] A Fire Code for Software?
To:  <systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>


            

Andy - drop the second shoe! What happened?    

Martyn
        
    On 08/03/2018 12:14, Andy Ashworth      wrote:
              I have experienced this difference of        appproach very recently on a major infra-structure project. The        project in question involved thedesign and construction of a        13km light-rail line with a tunnel section, 10 surface stations,        3 sub-surface stations, and a maintenance depot / yard. The        engineering members of the project management team were largely        civil engineers with experience of tunneling and permanent way.       
            The project schedule assumed that the        overall project could be delivered based on delivery of discrete        components. There was no consideration of how the components        would be integrated to achieve customer requirements. Safety        assurance was meant to be against IEC 61508, however the civil        engineering types had no awareness of this standard and planned        all tasks based on post-design safety assurance through testing.        For a civil engineer, there is little or no need for them to        consider integrated system behaviour - a tunnel, a bridge, or        any other structure is largely passive when it comes to failure        modes; whereas functional safety requires a more pro-active        consideration of how things work and how they fail.       
            Until safety and the role of systems        engineering is better understood throughout the whol engineering        community, there will be differences in approach - essentially        civil and mechanical engineers use design codes / standards that        give appropriate margins in loading of structures - there is no        need to consider further the failure modes of a bridge or        structure, the code/standard has already done this. If you have        “hardcore died-in-the-wool” civil engineers in all project        management roles, it can be extremely difficult and stressful to        educate them of the need to consider how systems work.      
            This project, and prior experience in        similar environments, had made me question my role in        engineering.      
            Andy        
  



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