[SystemSafety] Autonomously Driven Car Kills Pedestrian

[Andrew Banks]

Agreeing with David (shock horror!) it should also be noted that, in the UK, the official policy of the Department for Transport (DfT) is not to regulate as “this will stifle innovation”, and have explicitly ruled out mandating ISO 26262 (for non-autonomous as well as autonomous) unless and until UNECE do so.

 

IMHO this policy is very worrying…

 

A

 

From: systemsafety [mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] On Behalf Of David Ward
Sent: 20 March 2018 12:36
To: systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Autonomously Driven Car Kills Pedestrian

 

There is an SAE document SAE J3018 “Guidelines for Safe On-Road Testing of SAE Level 3, 4, and 5 Prototype Automated Driving Systems (ADS)” which includes reference to a “Safety development process”.  While this doesn’t explicitly refer to ISO 26262 some of the concepts are very similar.

 

David Ward

 

From: systemsafety [mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] On Behalf Of Martyn Thomas
Sent: 20 March 2018 12:31
Cc: systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Autonomously Driven Car Kills Pedestrian

 

Has anyone actually defined what evidence should be required before a level 5 AV should be licenced?

Regards

 

Martyn


On 20 Mar 2018, at 12:25, Tom Ferrell <tom at faaconsulting.com> wrote:

I agree that legislative bodies should not be waiving standards in general.  However, as I understand it, there are numerous stipulations in place on the self-driving trials underway in AZ including extensive data collection that were put in place by government.  Given the magnitude of what this technology is trying to accomplish, demonstration on closed tracks, through simulation, or controlled experiments is simply not going to be enough.  How long do you propose waiting before these vehicles can be on public streets?

 

As for the claims relating to lives saved:  This is exactly the same argument that has been made for a host of other ‘safety-enhancement’ systems and devices.  The issue here is that it removes the human from the immediate control loop, a step further than systems like TCAS that ultimately had to be mandated by Congress given the pushback from the airframers and pilots.  The success of that system was quickly evident and is no longer disputed. 

 

I agree that the burden to prove this technology is safe is the designers/manufacturer’s to bear.  I am just saying that we need to stay focused on clearly articulating why we feel the trials or approaches being taken are technically in error or inadequate.  Otherwise, our voices will just get lumped in with the luddites pushing back against change.

 

From: systemsafety [mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] On Behalf Of C. Michael Holloway
Sent: Tuesday, March 20, 2018 8:02 AM
To: systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Autonomously Driven Car Kills Pedestrian

 

... This revolution is coming whether we like it or not.  ...

Well, if it should not be coming yet, it is our duty to do everything we can to slow it down to a reasonable pace. That's the point that Prof. Cummings was making in the WaPO article. There are a bunch of ridiculous claims being made by the self-driving car zealots, which are unfortunately being accepted by the US Congress. The most egregious is the assertions about the number of lives that can saved. That's not a reason it is an excuse. If saving lives was the motivation, there are far simpler ways to accomplish it. 



What we should be asking is whether the systems being employed in these vehicles have been developed correctly in accordance with ISO26262 or similar standard. 

The US Congress exempted self-driving cars from having to meet *any* standards. That should not have happened, regardless of whether this particular accident turns out to have been the automation's fault.

-- 
All the best,
C. Michael Holloway (cMh)
Senior Research Computer Engineer
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton VA USA
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(The words in this message are mine alone;
neither blame nor credit NASA for them.)

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