[SystemSafety] Autonomously Driven Car Kills Pedestrian

[Nick Tudor]

The IET have just put out this (which you may have seen elsewhere and I'm
not sure of the actual source):

The lawyer for Elaine Herzberg's daughter and husband says the matter has
been resolved, as Uber comes under fresh pressure over links to Arizona
governor.

Relatives of the woman killed by an Uber self-driving SUV have reached a
settlement with the Silicon Valley start-up, forestalling a potentially
lengthy legal battle over the first-known fatality involving an autonomous
vehicle (AV).

Cristina Perez Hesano, a lawyer for the daughter and husband of Elaine
Herzberg, 49, said the matter had now been resolved between Uber and
Herzberg’s family.

No details of the terms of the settlement were revealed.


Nick Tudor
Tudor Associates Ltd
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www.tudorassoc.com

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On 29 March 2018 at 06:53, Andrew Banks <andrew at andrewbanks.com> wrote:

> Hi John
>
>
>
> >> That said, I am curious how you thing this should be done?
>
>
>
> The software industry has a long-standing inability to conform to
> standards and best-practice.
>
>
>
> In the past, DEF-STAN-2167(A) and MIL-STD-498 have laid down detailed
> processes to follow, for flight (and defence) software… these have
> subsequently evolved and been adopted more widely as ISO/IEC 12207 (and the
> plethora of subordinate standards for the various processes)… CMM/CMMI has
> evolved into ISO 15504 and then ISO 330xx (SPICE)… software quality
> requirements (in the form of the ISO 250xx (SQuaRE) series is well define.
>
>
>
> None have been widely adopted, although some industries have evolved their
> own versions (eg some of the EN 5xxxx).
>
>
>
> Meanwhile, accreditation in the form of the TickIT scheme (assessed
> against the above) has failed to gain critical mass.
>
>
>
> Now, I am sure that some will squeal how Waterfall or V-model are not
> suitable… and/or that MISRA C/C++ are excessive.  But in the absence of a
> better standard, surely we should be following what there is, and
> developing that better standard in parallel.
>
>
>
> Regards
>
> A
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* systemsafety [mailto:systemsafety-bounces@
> lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] *On Behalf Of *John Howard
> *Sent:* 28 March 2018 17:16
> *To:* Steve Tockey; systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
>
> *Subject:* Re: [SystemSafety] Autonomously Driven Car Kills Pedestrian
>
>
>
> Thanks for clarifying Steve.  Perhaps my perception is different because
> of the industry I am most closely involved with (defense).  My only insight
> into the rest of the industry was the Waymo report from last year, which I
> thought outlined a reasonable approach given the lack of any other software
> safety standards specific to the automotive industry.  (They at least claim
> to use ISO 26262 and MIL-STD-882E as basis for their own System Safety
> Program.)  {On The Road to Fully Self-Driving: Waymo Safety Report, Oct.
> 2017}
>
> In regard to our own processes, I obviously can't share details, but the
> governing safety standard is MIL-STD-882E.  It is not sufficient on it's
> own so we are also developing internal processes which borrow heavily from
> ISO 26262, and use MBSE (SysML with MagicDraw).  In addition, the systems
> we develop are evaluated by the Army Test and Evaluation Center (ATEC),
> which gives every system a safety rating related to hazard risk.  I need to
> be careful what I say here since I am fairly certain that some ATEC folks
> are also on this list. ;-)
>
> That said, I am curious how you thing this should be done?  Should the
> entire industry wait for someone to develop a process similar to DO-178 for
> the automotive industry?  Should software developers be prohibited from
> producing safety critical software without some kind of certification?  I
> am very serious about these questions.  While I am skeptical that the
> industry is quite as bad as you make it seem, I can certainly agree it
> isn't what it should be.  I just don't know what the answer is, and am
> eager to learn from others to improve our own internal processes in the
> mean time.
>
> --
>
> John Howard, Sr. Systems Engineer
>
> Robotic Research, LLC
>
> 22300 Comsat Dr.
>
> Clarksburg, MD 20871
>
> Office: 240-631-0008 x274 <(240)%20631-0008>
>
> On 3/27/2018 5:03 PM, Steve Tockey wrote:
>
>
>
> John,
>
> You can interpret my email as a scathing indictment of the mainstream software
> industry as a whole. I am already on record as saying,
>
>
>
> “We are an industry of highly paid amateurs”.
>
>
>
> The company I work for, Construx, interacts with hundreds of
> “professional” software development teams each and every year. Having met
> in person the people inside these companies (both high-profile companies
> and not), it is clear that the vast majority of the people & projects I
> have met with are square in the middle of “highly paid amateur” syndrome.
> That includes the likes of, for example, Google, Facebook, Amazon,
> Microsoft, Alibaba, and so on. Given how pervasive corporate cultures
> are, I would be shocked and amazed if the software developers in Google’s
> self-driving car team are in any way different that those in the rest of
> that company. I could be wrong, but I don’t think there is a very high
> probability of that.
>
>
>
> To hear that your organization is different is very good news. I am very
> happy to hear that there is at least one organization in the self-driving
> car software space that is actually taking things seriously. I would also
> exclude from “highly paid amateur” syndrome, generally speaking,
> avionics vendors (Honeywell, Rockwell Collins, . . .) and to a slightly
> lesser extent the medical device companies because of
> the externally imposed standards.
>
>
>
> That being said, are you willing to provide any more detail about how your
> organization is doing things differently than in the mainstream software
> industry? For example:
>
>
>
> *) Are you following any specific software safety standards, ISO 26262,
> DO-178C, . . .? If so, which one(s)?
>
>
>
> *) Have you adapted your software development processes / procedures
> around any of those standards? If so, are you willing to share how?
> Specifically, I mean that DO-178C requires that teams produce
> written requirements and design documentation but it is left up to the
> organization to determine what that documentation looks like. Might you be
> willing to share what your document templates look like?
>
>
>
> *) How are you determining that any given software project is actually
> complying with the applicable standards / processes / procedures? Are there
> independent audits of any kind?
>
>
>
> *) Do you have any personnel qualifications on the developers? For
> example, say, you hire, train, and promote developers around a set
> of qualifications derived from the Software Engineering Body of Knowledge
> (SWEBOK)?
>
>
>
> *) How is someone with, can I say, legitimate “engineering” experience
> and expertise involved in the software development activities? Are said
> people actually licensed / chartered engineers? If so, what engineering
> disciplines are they licensed / chartered in?
>
>
>
> *) Do the engineering teams determine realistic project schedules based on
> given project scope (or, alternatively, determine realistic scope based
> on given project schedules)? Or, are project scopes and schedules imposed
> by external stakeholders?
>
>
>
>
>
> — steve
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From: *systemsafety <systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>
> on behalf of John Howard <jhoward at roboticresearch.com>
> *Organization: *Robotic Research LLC
> *Date: *Monday, March 26, 2018 at 7:35 AM
> *To: *"systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de" <
> systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>
> *Subject: *Re: [SystemSafety] Autonomously Driven Car Kills Pedestrian
>
>
>
> Perhaps I am misunderstanding.  Is this your perception of the
> self-driving car industry?  If so, on what basis?
>
> I cannot speak for other companies, but I can assure you that none of
> these statements apply to any of the autonomous vehicle project I am
> involved with.
>
> --
>
> John Howard, Sr. Systems Engineer
>
> Robotic Research, LLC
>
> 22300 Comsat Dr.
>
> Clarksburg, MD 20871
>
> Office: 240-631-0008 x274 <(240)%20631-0008>
>
> On 3/25/2018 1:39 PM, Steve Tockey wrote:
>
>
>
> FWIW, I found some interesting quotes in the following article:
>
>
>
> http://time.com/5213690/verruckt-slide-death-schlitterbahn/
>
>
>
>
>
> Could  these be applied in cases involving self-driving cars?
>
>
>
> “was never properly or fully designed”
>
>
>
> “rushed it into use and had no technical or engineering expertise”
>
>
>
> “complied with “few, if any” longstanding safety standards”
>
>
>
> “the . . . death and the rapidly growing list of injuries were
> foreseeable and expected outcomes”
>
>
>
> “desire to “rush the project” and . . . designer’s lack of expertise
> caused them to “skip fundamental steps in the design process.””
>
>
>
> “not a single engineer was directly involved in . . . engineering or . .
> . design”
>
>
>
>
>
> It seems as though all of these statements would apply equally to any case
> involving self-driving cars.
>
>
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>
>
> — steve
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From: *systemsafety <systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>
> on behalf of Matthew Squair <mattsquair at gmail.com>
> *Date: *Friday, March 23, 2018 at 5:03 PM
> *To: *Peter Bernard Ladkin <ladkin at causalis.com>, "
> systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de" <systemsafety at lists.techfak.
> uni-bielefeld.de>
> *Subject: *Re: [SystemSafety] Autonomously Driven Car Kills Pedestrian
>
>
>
> I think Uber will come unglued in civil court.
>
>
>
> If say the driver is legally deemed to not be in direct control but
> ‘supervising’ by the court then Uber is still liable for devising a method
> of supervision of an unsafe device that demonstrably doesn’t work, and it
> could be argued they could have reasonably known this in the
> circumstances*. If the argument turns that the driver is solely the
> culpable agent then as he’s also a Uber employee/contractor they’re still
> responsible for his actions. So, which ever way it turns Uber will carry
> the can, at least in a civil prosecution which is where this will get
> thrashed out I’d guess.
>
>
>
> ‘Move fast and break things’ indeed…
>
>
>
> *As the conversation on this thread would indicate.
>
> On 24 March 2018 at 4:16:49 am, Peter Bernard Ladkin (ladkin at causalis.com)
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2018-03-23 17:40 , Michael Jackson wrote:
> >
> > So the responsibility in overseeing autonomous driving is worse than
> that of an old-fashioned
> > driving instructor in a dual-control car, teaching an untrusted
> learner—you can’t even order
> > the software to slow down: in short, it is far more demanding and
> stressful than driving the
> > car yourself.
> Spot on, as usual.
>
> Woods and Sarter, in their seminal study of pilots using A320 automation,
> found it was worse than
> that. When the situation got odd, rather than cutting out the automation
> and taking control ("first,
> fly the airplane"), they found the crew inclined to try to debug the
> automation.
>
> PBL
>
> Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bielefeld, Germany
> MoreInCommon
> Je suis Charlie
> Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319 <+49%20521%208807319> www.rvs-bi.de
>
>
>
>
>
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