[SystemSafety] Collected stopgap measures

Martyn Thomas martyn at thomas-associates.co.uk
Sat Nov 3 19:52:52 CET 2018


Unfortunately, IES 61508 isn't fit for purpose in a world with far more
software than hardware and a large and growing cybersecurity threat. It
was a decent standard for the 1980s, when almost nothing else existed.

It can't be fixed because the standardisation process is broken:
dominated by industry (because few others can afford to participate
fully - or get compensated for the mind-numbing tedium of endless
meetings with opposition from people with a different agenda). Industry
is good at standardising plugs and sockets, but useless at setting aside
commercial interests in the public good.  Which is why 61508 is
illogical, unscientific, and irredeemable. Public good standards should
be written by independent experts, throwing down the gauntlet to
industry to decide whether or not to follow the standard.

Martyn


On 03/11/2018 10:13, Paul Sherwood wrote:
>> Developing SW according to IEC 61508-3:2010 will involve you in almost
>> 60 documentation
>> requirements. You will have to produce those 60 documents. About a
>
> Only if we believe that the IEC spells and incantations are fit for
> their purpose. Perhaps following them blindly will be enough to help
> defend in court in the event of accident. Or perhaps not.
>
> In the security world, Geer's Law is often cited: "Any security
> technology whose effectiveness can't be empirically determined is
> indistinguishable from blind luck."
>
> I fear that in the safety world, there's not enough transparency to
> establish what has been luck and what is effective. 

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