[SystemSafety] Collected stopgap measures

[Olwen Morgan]

ROTFLMAO!


On 05/11/2018 09:59, Paul Sherwood wrote:
>> If, on a list devoted to safety critical systems, your best is to
>> suggest that we need neither documented requirements nor documented
>> designs, then you may have to acquiesce in having some people think
>> that your best is a long way short of good enough.
>
> I don't believe I suggested that these things are not required **for 
> critical systems**.
>
> I've said that lots of successful **software** has been created 
> without, including some popular software which has been deployed in 
> critical systems, which is clearly true.
>
> Without system-level requirements and architecture I don't see how 
> there could be a basis for making any claim of safety. It's once we 
> get into the practice of software that your argument breaks down, imo.
>
> Clearly some software continues to be constructed based on 
> pre-existing requirements and architecture, but most is not, these 
> days. From my perspective the risks associated with starting from 
> scratch on large projects may outweigh the risks of using 'cots', even 
> if the existing code came into existence without ticking the boxes 
> that became enshrined in lore some decades ago.
>
>>>> ... and heaven forfend that anyone make the contrapositive inference.
>>>
>>> I'm not going to bother attempting to parse that.
>>>
>>>
>> .... engineers and language again ... and if you think this is
>> trolling, let me point out that, just as there is a distinction
>> between irony and sarcasm, so also is there a distinction between
>> trolling and sublimated ennui.
>>
>> I reserve the right to express irritation at being confronted by
>> patent incompetence on a list like this.
>
> And I reserve the right to be wrong, whereas you appear to believe 
> that you are correct always.
>
>