[SystemSafety] Autopilot interface?

Thu Nov 8 17:53:01 CET 2018

Noted - and I'll acknowledge what some may consider a bias in this area:

One should not, IMO, rely on training to compensate for a suboptimal 
HMI. I don't know enough about these systems to be able to say whether 
that has happened here but I tend to have a high index of suspicion in 
the matter.

Surely one should always ask with regard to any element of training, 
whether it is there to compensate for poor cognitive design of an 
interface? What one needs to aim for is a situation in which, as far as 
possible, the result of the human user's thinking fast is that he/she 
gets a correct view of a situation. (Here, I mean thinking-fast vs. 
thinking-slow as described by Kahnemann). If the HMI is such that the 
user cannot get a correct view of subsystem state immediately at sight, 
isn't there something wrong?

And in this case might not the default / override mechanism also have 
been unhelpfully counterintuitive?

For sure, the designers of cockpit HMIs are a lot better than the code 
monkeys who crank out crass web pages, but misinterpretation of 
instruments has been a factor in many aviation incidents. I've never 
felt entirely satisfied that QA for critical system HMIs is as 
systematic as it ought to be.

But, then, this is not my specialist field and I'll gladly stand 
corrected by HMI experts.

Olwen

On 08/11/2018 15:35, Nick Tudor wrote:
> As noted in the report - more like sub-optimal pilot 
> training/procedures....first check the number you entered, then set 
> the height...not too difficult....
>
> Nick Tudor
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> On Thu, 8 Nov 2018 at 14:43, Olwen Morgan <olwen at phaedsys.com 
> <mailto:olwen at phaedsys.com>> wrote:
>
>
>     Interesting.
>
>     I'm left with the impression that suboptimal HMI design has reared
>     its head here.
>
>
>     Olwen
>
>
>     On 08/11/2018 14:18, SPRIGGS, John J wrote:
>>
>>     This is where the BBC got it from:
>>     https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5bc73322ed915d0b0349a662/DHC-8-402_Dash_8_G-ECOE_11-18.pdf
>>
>>
>>     *From:*systemsafety
>>     [mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] *On
>>     Behalf Of *Michael J. Pont
>>     *Sent:* 08 November 2018 12:26
>>     *To:* 'The System Safety List'
>>     *Subject:* [SystemSafety] Autopilot interface?
>>
>>     A report on the BBC website of a flight incident earlier this year:
>>     https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-46137445
>>
>>     According to the BBC:
>>
>>     --- BEGIN QUOTE ---
>>
>>     The plane climbed to 1,500ft, but then pitched and "descended
>>     rapidly" because autopilot was set with a target altitude of 0ft.
>>
>>     Staff reported that the plane "had become visual with the
>>     ground", and the report said the aircraft had reached a maximum
>>     rate of descent of 4,300ft/min.
>>
>>     --- END QUOTE ---
>>
>>     I've never had responsibility for the design of an autopilot
>>     interface, but I'd have thought that you'd probably want to make
>>     it difficult to set a target height of 0 ft under these conditions?
>>
>>     Michael.
>>
>>     Michael J. Pont
>>     SafeTTy Systems Ltd.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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