[SystemSafety] The mindset for safety-critical systems design

[clayton at veriloud.com]

Some quick comments…(I’m catching up too ;-)

> On Sep 18, 2018, at 8:11 AM, Olwen Morgan <olwen.morgan at btinternet.com> wrote:
> 
> 1.    Whatever is not there cannot go wrong (so do not include any functions that you do not need).


MISRA-C:2012 has “Directive” saying all code shall be traceable to documented requirements with reference to DO-178C Section 6.4.4.3.d

Also in MISRA-C:2012’s preamble it points to complexity thresholding being one of the "Process activities expected by MISRA C”.  

In addition some specific rules address path complexity  (sort of), e.g. no dead or unreachable code, though these are “undecidable” rules not feasibly enforceable at the system level. 

I say "not feasibly enforceable at the system level”, keeping in mind the old paper "The Infeasibility of Quantifying the Reliability of Life-Critical Real-Time Software -  Butler, Finelli” which Philip Koopman among others referred to in expert testimony not too long ago ( https://bit.ly/1XgBA1j <https://bit.ly/1XgBA1j> )





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