[SystemSafety] GPS jamming
Mike Rothon
mike.rothon at certisa.com
Fri Jul 12 13:56:53 CEST 2019
Hi Dewi,
Agreed, I too find this worrying.
Sorry, I made a mistake earlier. Standard equipment is single / dual
Universal FMS, coupled to Honeywell Primus 1000 navigation receivers and
displays etc. I think it is safe to assume this was a WAAS fit.
I suspect there are many different levels of spoofing - including
spoofing the combined GNSS / WAAS solution. It is conceivable that any
protection offered by WAAS can be defeated.
Perhaps the moral of this incident is: backup any primary navigation
source with an independent system (VOR, DME, even NDB, clock and compass!)
Mike
*Mike Rothon* M::+44 7718 209010 mike.rothon at certisa.com
*Certisa* Safety, Testing, Documentation and Certification. ISO
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On 12/07/2019 11:57, Dewi Daniels wrote:
> Mike,
>
> That is very puzzling and worrying. I would have expected a Cessna
> Citation 560XL flying IFR to be fitted with a WAAS receiver. My
> understanding is that WAAS was intended to detect spoofing as well as
> jamming. The WAAS specification states, "WAAS provides the additional
> accuracy, availability, continuity and integrity necessary to enable
> users to rely on GPS for all phases of flight, from en route through
> approaches with vertical guidance, at all qualified airports within
> the WAAS LPV coverage area". Either the equipment on the aircraft was
> not working as intended, or WAAS itself does not work as intended. I
> would have expected either possibility to be investigated with some
> urgency.
>
> Yours,
>
> Dewi Daniels | Director | Software Safety Limited
>
> Telephone +44 7968 837742 | Email d
> <mailto:ddaniels at verocel.com>ewi.daniels at software-safety.com
> <mailto:ewi.daniels at software-safety.com>
>
> Software Safety Limited is a company registered in England and Wales.
> Company number: 9390590. Registered office: Fairfield, 30F Bratton
> Road, West Ashton, Trowbridge, United Kingdom BA14 6AZ
>
>
>
> On Fri, 12 Jul 2019 at 11:21, Mike Rothon <mike.rothon at certisa.com
> <mailto:mike.rothon at certisa.com>> wrote:
>
> The incident report is available on the NASA ASRS database at
> https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/search/database.html. Search by Report
> Number (ACN) for 1565516.
>
> It was a Cessna Citation 560XL, a mid-size business jet. These are
> reasonably well equipped, usually a single or dual Honeywell
> Primus 1000 package (when built).
>
> I thought this system was capable of DME/DME as well, but I have
> no idea how the solution would be compared or prioritised against
> a solid WAAS signal.
>
> It would seem that the action was more 'spoofing' rather than
> jamming, so probably the avionics thought it was getting a good
> signal (I'm speculating here though).
>
> It is worth noting that the report was made by a qualified
> controller. His / her assessment is quite definitive and chilling
> really.
>
> Mike
>
>
> On 12/07/2019 10:40, SPRIGGS, John J wrote:
>>
>> Hi Dewi,
>>
>> The original article does not tell us enough; if it were an
>> airliner, it could not use ‘vanilla GPS’ and would have to have
>> the RAIM capability mentioned in 1.7.1 of the document to which
>> you linked.
>>
>> I suspect that it was one of those small aircraft that have a GPS
>> antenna stuck to the windscreen, which can itself degrade the
>> solution by occluding satellites.
>>
>> John
>>
>> *From:*systemsafety
>> <systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>
>> <mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de> *On
>> Behalf Of *Dewi Daniels
>> *Sent:* 12 July 2019 10:25
>> *To:* The System Safety List
>> <systemsafety at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>
>> <mailto:systemsafety at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>
>> *Subject:* Re: [SystemSafety] GPS jamming
>>
>> I'm puzzled. I thought the whole point of WAAS (and EGNOS) was
>> that the pilot would be alerted if the GPS calculated position is
>> inaccurate. See section 1.7.2 of
>> https://www.gps.gov/technical/ps/2008-WAAS-performance-standard.pdf .
>> Why was the pilot not alerted in this instance? Was he not using
>> a WAAS receiver? If not, why was he relying on a vanilla GPS
>> receiver for navigation?
>>
>> Yours,
>>
>> Dewi Daniels | Director | Software Safety Limited
>>
>> Telephone +44 7968 837742 | Email d
>> <mailto:ddaniels at verocel.com>ewi.daniels at software-safety.com
>> <mailto:ewi.daniels at software-safety.com>
>>
>> Software Safety Limited is a company registered in England and
>> Wales. Company number: 9390590. Registered office: Fairfield, 30F
>> Bratton Road, West Ashton, Trowbridge, United Kingdom BA14 6AZ
>>
>> On Wed, 10 Jul 2019 at 12:49, Robert P. Schaefer <rps at mit.edu
>> <mailto:rps at mit.edu>> wrote:
>>
>> Thought this would be of interest:
>>
>> NASA report: Passenger aircraft nearly crashes due GPS disruption
>>
>> https://www.gpsworld.com/nasa-report-passenger-aircraft-nearly-crashes-due-gps-disruption/
>>
>> Along the lines of “Who the heck would jam GPS in the
>> continental US?”,
>>
>> I’ve got an anecdotal story from one of Haystack’s scientists
>> who was trying to collect GPS data
>>
>> (L1, L2 data is useful for measuring solar activity in the
>> Ionosphere) during the solar eclipse in August 2017.
>>
>> He was unable to collect data because of GPS jamming. The
>> story was that truckers use GPS jammers so they
>>
>> won’t be tracked by their employers.
>>
>> bob s.
>>
>> research engineer
>>
>> MIT haystack observatory
>>
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