[SystemSafety] Fwd: Re: CbyC and unit testing

Olwen Morgan olwen at phaedsys.com
Fri Jul 3 22:28:15 CEST 2020




On 03/07/2020 16:04, Peter Bernard Ladkin wrote:


<snip>


In keeping with what I'd said previously, I do not regard mathematical 
truths as analytic. (The assertion that they are is, IMHO, part of 
Kant's monumental clusterf*ck - there's bigoted Buddhism for you :-). Hence:

1. I'd hoped you'd realise that I might take a non-standard (to put it 
mildly) view of the interpretation of logical formulae and that my 
concocting a deliberately careless, gung-ho traduction might help to 
elicit what you actually meant. I'm not as stupid as I made myself out 
to be. ... ;-)

<snip>

>>     My position is: ¬[](Use-CbyC -> ¬[]Perform-UT). That is to say I 
>> do not think it necessarily
>> the case that use of CbyC renders UT unnecessary.
> Your statement is logically equivalent to <>(Use-CbyC & []Perform-UT) 
> which is that it is possible
> that you use CbyC and you have to perform full unit testing.
> Those two statements aren't inconsistent with each other.

... and ...

2. In consequence of holding a purely empirical view of logical 
modalities, I view claims of these statements' equivalence based solely 
on logic as profoundly meaningless word-games.


(For readers who are by now totally confused, I hold to Arnold's 
position that mathematics is part of natural science and that 
mathematical statements and scientific statements are not different in 
character.)


So, after now having elicited what seems to me to be a helpful 
clarification of your position, I repeat a previous question: If you 
hold that the use of CbyC means that you can possibly avoid 
unit-testing, are there any circumstances in which you would concede 
that you can use CbyC and yet in which it is not possible to avoid unit 
testing? Please explain your reasoning.

Olwen

PS: Readers please be aware that PBL has already, privately, suggested 
that I am a nutcase ... which I take as a great compliment ... :-))






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