[SystemSafety] State of the art for "safe Linux"

[Martyn Thomas]

Even total path coverage couldn’t find all faults, as you need to test with all possible combinations of data. 

Static analysis can find the potential zero divide in 1/a-b almost instantly, or show its absence. Which is  infeasible with testing

Regards

Martyn

> On 7 Aug 2024, at 12:11, Prof. Dr. Peter Bernard Ladkin <ladkin at causalis.com> wrote:
> 
> On 2024-08-07 11:38 , Paul Sherwood wrote:
>> On 2024-08-07 10:28, Prof. Dr. Peter Bernard Ladkin wrote:
>>>>> [Dewi Daniels] If
>>>>> your tests haven't achieved statement coverage, then there's code that
>>>>> you've never executed, not even once, during your testing.
>>>> 
>>>> I understand the argument, but this last sentence is flawed.
>>> 
>>> How is the last sentence "flawed"? It seems to me a clear statement of the obvious (which I imagine is what Dewi intended).
>> 
>> Because we can **test**, without creating **tests**. We may have executed the code, but not created tests for it.
> 
> Let me rephrase. Dewi's statement above is a tautology.
> 
> I imagine he made it in order to remind us of the importance of statement coverage in constructing tests of critical software.
> 
> PBL
> 
> Prof. Dr. Peter Bernard Ladkin
> Causalis Limited/Causalis IngenieurGmbH, Bielefeld, Germany
> Tel: +49 (0)521 3 29 31 00
> 
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