[SystemSafety] ISO and IEC Technical Specifications on Functional Safety and AI

Bruce Hunter brucer.hunter at gmail.com
Thu Oct 23 07:22:21 CEST 2025


Sorry Les, can't cheer you up yet...

Coolness always always seems to Conquer Caution, which Constrains
Convenience, Convincing the need for Coolness :-)

Certainly the Australian press is impressed FINALLY: Tesla Full
Self-Driving unlocked in Australia... for some | Drive
<https://www.drive.com.au/news/tesla-full-self-driving-unlocked-in-australia-for-public-use-but-not-for-all-customers/>

Others are more hesitant,
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-09-24/tesla-self-driving-technology-rules-differ-around-australia/105808104,
stating "The National Transport Commission is developing a framework to
govern the use of autonomous vehicles Australia-wide before technology
evolves further". Maybe this should have been done before FSD (Supervise)
mode feature was released for downloading. Just a little software update
costing only $10K...

>From what I understand, the "supervised" bit is surveillance of the
driver's eyes, dropping out of FSD if it "sees" it not being focussed on
the road. I hope this is also considered a safety function.

I miss the days of fully proven functional safety systems where we are
dependably protected from dangerous failures. In a similar vein, I am
seeing IoT and Cloud system applications appearing in gas pipeline
protection systems without the application of functional safety standards.

It goes way back to what I was taught as a very young engineer - "just
because you can doesn't mean you should; just because you should doesn't
mean you can."

Maybe I'm just getting too sceptical at my age...

Bruce Hunter



On Tue, 21 Oct 2025 at 09:52, Les Chambers <les at chambers.com.au> wrote:

> Michael
>
> Thanks for your concern regarding the integration of AI with
> Safety-Critical
> systems.
>
> Tesla full self driving/supervised is now available in Australia. There
> have
> been some crazy behaviours.
>
> Refer: https://bit.ly/CrazyTeslaFSD
>
> It seems the classical engineering definition of the term, "technology"
> remains axiomatic. "Technology is a thing that was invented after you were
> born and … remains a thing that doesn't quite work yet."
> Elon is yet to get his functional safety act together.
>
> To me, it is annoying that these vehicles, guided as they are with
> immature
> technology, were allowed on Australian roads by naive regulators.
>
> I'm yet to discover any AI driven guidance system that can deliver the SIL
> 4/ASIL D Performance that these vehicles should provide. It seems to me
> that
> attempts to develop functional safety standards for this class of system
> are
> fruitless given:
> 1. No one, including their developers, fully understands why or how they
> work
> at all.
> 2. The black box that is AI is a demonstrably unreliable agent in the
> service
> of public safety. Further, the most effective risk management strategy in
> assuring SIL 4/ASIL D performance is to remove the AI black box altogether.
>
> I have faith that, in the fullness of time, this problem will be solved
> with
> Gold Standard neural networks that can be trusted. Waymo is heading in
> this
> direction but with a US$250,000 vehicle geofenced to territory thoroughly
> LIDAR-mapped and bristling with LIDAR sensors.
>
> In the meantime, shareholder value and the "but-it's-so-cool!!" zeitgeist
> has
> trumped public safety guiding vehicles with neural networks that class
> somewhere south of bronze standard.
>
> After 50 years engineering safety-critical systems, beginning with direct
> software control of potentially explosive chemical reactions in the 1970s,
> I'm
> watching my profession seemingly discard decades of lessons we paid for
> dearly
> —in nervous breakdowns, blood and treasure.
>
> A sad state of affairs.
>
> If anyone on this list could cheer me up, I would be most grateful.
>
> Cheers
> Les
>
> > Hello everybody!
> >
> > Generally I like to stay out of the discussion here although I
> appreciate
> this resource very much. As my company works on automation devices and
> especially small proximity sensors I would get a quite narrow viewing
> angle so
> it is important to get information like I get it here, from avionics
> through
> railway through other systems.
> >
> > Unfortunately I don't have further information on the self-driving car
> industry and what they do to justify what they put on the market. In
> Germany
> you would have the institution of the Kraftfahrtbundesamt as an
> institution
> and I am very sure that they are quite conservative about that. But this
> shows
> why everybody is eager on rulesets regarding AI in functional safety so we
> are
> working on that.
> >
> > Very interesting that we standardize safety and AI while there still is
> debate about what AI really is. But actually there seem to be some systems
> that might save lives so we need to look under which circumstances that
> can be
> allowed. I think if I would need to defend the use of AI in safety at the
> moment people would ask why I took that risk and used AI. Somewhere in the
> future it could be that I need to defend myself because I didn't use AI
> because it would have prevented the accident. Some say that moment will
> never
> come. Some say this moment is in the past, maybe not for something as
> complex
> as self-driving cars but perhaps in other applications with perhaps less
> dimensional inputs.
> >
> > Some would say risk reduction below SIL 1 should not be regulated too
> strongly. But when I think about how people put some data into a system
> and
> cheer if it showed nice behaviour it might be good to ask about
> requirement
> management, configuration management and solid proof of validity of the
> concept - so speak about functional safety management to the AI audience.
> That's the direction now that the ISO/IEC group will meet in Sydney this
> week
> for TS 22440.
> >
> > But not to bore with this stuff - maybe not a safety application but a
> case
> where people are detected using WLAN routers - even if they don't have
> WLAN
> devices with them. A little scary but they say in a different article that
> they could distinguish people walking into a room even when they carried a
> container with bottles of beer. That showed me that this is a realistic
> University scenario here in Germany. This is the only resource I found in
> English but it is actually also distributed from other sources.
> > https://interestingengineering.com/innovation/wifi-tech-can-identify-
> individuals
> >
> > Curious where AI and safety will go. Have a good week!
> > Michael
> >
> > --
> > Michael KINDERMANN (he/him)
> > Head of Functional Safety
> > Team Leader Safety & Security
> > Dpt. Global Compliance
> > Pepperl+Fuchs SE, Mannheim
> >
> > Pepperl+Fuchs SE, Mannheim
> > Vorstand/Board member: Dr. Wilhelm Nehring (Vors.), Tobias Blöcher,
> Lutz
> Liebers, Reiner Müller, Florian Ochs, Martin Walter
> > Vorsitzende des Aufsichtsrats/Chairwoman of the supervisory board:
> Monika
> Müller-Michael
> > Registergericht/Register Court: AG Mannheim HRB 737016 ∙ UST-ID Nr. DE
> 143877372
> >
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>
> --
> Les Chambers
> les at chambers.com.au
>
> https://www.chambers.com.au
> https://www.systemsengineeringblog.com
>
> +61 (0)412 648 992
>
>
>
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