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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 10/07/2020 11:24, Dewi Daniels
      wrote:</div>
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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><snip><br>
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cite="mid:CANQd8eV267FDwdov42=PPB+TLAbqeN+Dv6Mq5KsGjfhXuwGK0w@mail.gmail.com">
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        <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm
8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> requirements
          engineers only considered a single activation of MCAS. They do
          not appear to have considered
          the possibility that MCAS could activate repeatedly,
          eventually driving the
          stabilizer to a fully nose down position.</p>
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    <p><snip></p>
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    <p>This goes nicely with my example of the Wichman-Hill PRANG. The
      essence of the required behaviour is a condition on repeated calls
      to the routine that generates a single random number. Only
      iterative testing could provide confidence in its correctness.
      With MCAS, iterated tests or stress tests of the software might
      have revealed the problem.</p>
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    <p>Olwen</p>
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cite="mid:CANQd8eV267FDwdov42=PPB+TLAbqeN+Dv6Mq5KsGjfhXuwGK0w@mail.gmail.com">
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                <p><a
name="SignatureSanitizer_SafeHtmlFilter_UNIQUE_ID_SafeHtmlFilter__MailAutoSig"
                    moz-do-not-send="true"><span
                      style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif">Yours,</span></a></p>
                <p><span
                    style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;font-size:10pt">Dewi
                    Daniels | Director | Software Safety Limited</span><br>
                </p>
                <p><span
                    style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif"
                    lang="FR">Telephone +44 7968 837742 | Email </span><span
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                      target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">ewi.daniels@software-safety.com</a></span></p>
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      <div class="gmail_quote">
        <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, 10 Jul 2020 at 10:42,
          Michael Jackson <<a href="mailto:jacksonma@acm.org"
            moz-do-not-send="true">jacksonma@acm.org</a>> wrote:<br>
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        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
          0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">CbyC
          is invaluable in avoiding errors in reasoning about formal
          models. But the relationship of a formal model---whether of a
          computer or of the real world of a cyber-physical system---may
          be a more prolific source of faiure. Recent posts cited the
          737Max8 disasters. Were these due to formal errors in MCAS
          code? <br>
          <br>
          -- Michael Jackson<br>
          <br>
          <br>
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