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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 14/09/2020 15:04, Martyn Thomas
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:226737c4-708c-8a79-d0b5-394fb6516781@72f.org">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <p>Why are you completely dismissing software reliablity? <br>
      </p>
      <p>Is it not the case that if you can tolerate a failure rate of
        once in 1000 hours, 99% confidence through testing would take
        about 200 days to demonstrate (so long as the test environment
        is "sufficiently" like the future operating environment and you
        are able to detaect every failure correctly)? <br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <p>And statistical testing is used in the UK nuclear industry fore
      safety critical systems, so it is not just abstract theory,</p>
    <p>Re your characterisation of confidence based statistical testing
      on P153 (with no reference), I do not think it is fair to dismiss
      this because "p can vary by orders of magnitude". Testing presumes
      a fixed operational profile and a constant probability of failure.
      <br>
    </p>
    <p>There has also been some work on the impact of profile change on
      the bound that can be claimed.</p>
    <p><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/307555914_Deriving_a_frequentist_conservative_confidence_bound_for_probability_of_failure_per_demand_for_systems_with_different_operational_and_test_profiles">https://www.researchgate.net/publication/307555914_Deriving_a_frequentist_conservative_confidence_bound_for_probability_of_failure_per_demand_for_systems_with_different_operational_and_test_profiles</a><br>
    </p>
    <p>BTW, re, your summary of my paper on the same page, I think you
      missed the main point. This is a<b> predictive</b> theory to
      derive a worst case bound for some time in the future, i.e. <br>
    </p>
    <p>Given N faults what is the worst possible reliability  at some
      future time T?<br>
      - it assumes fault fixing  will occur during that time.<br>
    </p>
    <p>You also only presented the theory of N=1, and you seem to assume
      the T has already happened with zero failures (not a requirement
      for this model)<br>
    </p>
    <p>Might have been better to reference the original worst case bound
      version (which makes it clear that it is a long term forward
      prediction)<br>
    </p>
    <p><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/3152200_A_conservative_theory_for_long-term_reliability-growth_prediction">https://www.researchgate.net/publication/3152200_A_conservative_theory_for_long-term_reliability-growth_prediction</a><br>
    </p>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:226737c4-708c-8a79-d0b5-394fb6516781@72f.org">
      <p> </p>
      <p>Of course, the testing would have to be repeated following a
        change to the software, unless you have enough formality to show
        that the change cannot affect reliability.</p>
      <p>In specific circumstances, you can do better than this. Bev
        Littlewood's published papers provide strong evidence and a rich
        bibliography. Bev's paper on "How reliable is a program that has
        never failed?" offers a useful rule-of-thumb: that aften n hours
        of fault free operation, there is about 50% chance of a failure
        in the following n hours (subject to some obvious constraints).<br>
      </p>
      <p>The difficulties rapidly escalate when you need 10^-4 or better
        at >90% confidence. <br>
      </p>
      <p>Martyn<br>
      </p>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 14/09/2020 14:14, SPRIGGS, John J
        wrote:<br>
      </div>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:LOYP265MB1888063E4BE5C54850A48119A6230@LOYP265MB1888.GBRP265.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM">
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          <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:6.0pt"><span
              style="font-family:"Roboto
              Light";color:#365F91;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">In
              my experience, if Software Reliability is mentioned at a
              conference, at least one member of the audience will
              laugh, and if it is mentioned in a work discussion, at
              least one member of the group will get angry.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:6.0pt"><span
              style="font-family:"Roboto
              Light";color:#365F91;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Interestingly,
              some of the same people who say it is impossible to
              quantify software failure rates will set numerical
              requirements for Software Availability – if you get one of
              those, ask the Customer how (s)he wants you to demonstrate
              satisfaction of the requirement.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:6.0pt"><span
              style="font-family:"Roboto
              Light";color:#365F91;mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:6.0pt"><span
              style="font-family:"Roboto
              Light";color:#365F91;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">John<o:p></o:p></span></p>
          <div>
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              1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm">
              <p class="MsoNormal"><b><span lang="EN-US">From:</span></b><span
                  lang="EN-US"> systemsafety <a
                    class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
                    href="mailto:systemsafety-bounces@lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de"
                    moz-do-not-send="true"><systemsafety-bounces@lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de></a>
                  <b>On Behalf Of </b>Derek M Jones<br>
                  <b>Sent:</b> 14 September 2020 12:54<br>
                  <b>To:</b> <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
                    href="mailto:systemsafety@lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de"
                    moz-do-not-send="true">systemsafety@lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de</a><br>
                  <b>Subject:</b> [SystemSafety] What do we know about
                  software reliability?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal">All,<br>
            <br>
            What do we know about software reliability?<br>
            <br>
            The answer appears to be, not a lot:<br>
            <a
href="http://shape-of-code.coding-guidelines.com/2020/09/13/learning-useful-stuff-from-the-reliability-chapter-of-my-book"
              moz-do-not-send="true">http://shape-of-code.coding-guidelines.com/2020/09/13/learning-useful-stuff-from-the-reliability-chapter-of-my-book/</a><br>
            <br>
            -- <br>
            Derek M. Jones Evidence-based software engineering<br>
            tel: +44 (0)1252 520667
            blog:shape-of-code.coding-guidelines.com<br>
            _______________________________________________<br>
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    <pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">-- 

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