[SystemSafety] NHTSA on the Tesla crash
Mike Ellims
michael.ellims at tesco.net
Mon Jan 23 11:13:09 CET 2017
The most common cause of traffic accidents in the UK is “Failure to look properly” which is cited as a contributing cause in 46% in 2014 of all road traffic accidents where police attended. “Failed to judge other persons speed or path” is cited in around 24% of cases Travelling too fast for conditions was however cited in only 7% of cases. In total “Driver/Rider error or reaction” is attributed to be the primary cause in over 70% of fatal accidents.
Interestingly for van and light goods vehicles the figure for “Failure to look properly” is closer to 30%.
Data from “Reported Road Casualties Great Britain: 2014 Annual Report”.
.
From: systemsafety [mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] On Behalf Of Nick Tudor
Sent: 23 January 2017 09:14
To: The System Safety List
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] NHTSA on the Tesla crash
I was wondering if is any data on the number of collisions/accidents that didn't happen because of human intervention?
On Mon, 23 Jan 2017 at 06:47, Peter Bernard Ladkin <ladkin at causalis.com> wrote:
On 2017-01-20 13:47 , Martyn Thomas wrote:
> All true, but if you sell it as an autopilot ...
It seems to me that there is already a chance to have things straighter for customers. NHTSA has
autodriving function classifications. There is a function called Automatic Emergency Braking, AEB.
"Automatic Emergency Braking includes the following crash avoidance technologies: Forward Collision
Warning (FCW), Dynamic Brake Support (DBS), and Crash Imminent Braking (CIB)" (Section 2, p1, of the
Tesla-crash report).
>From 2007 to 2011 there was a NHTSA-sponsored project undertaken by the "Crash Avoidance Metrics
Partnership" to evaluate CIB. "The final report from this project, released in September 2011,
validated the effectiveness of radar, camera and radar/camera fusion systems as rear-end collision
mitigation or avoidance technologies. The report also identified several crash modes that were not
validated by the project, including straight crossing path (SCP) and left turn across path (LTAP)
collisions."
The Tesla crash was an SCP scenario, as far as I understand it. "Not validated" in 2011. "Validated"
in 2016? Who knows? There is an opportunity. There is a partnership, a classification of scenarios,
and a historical attempt at evaluation. Why not introduce that vocabulary and start on standardised
tests with a requirement to advertise your autodriving functions in terms of test results? It won't
be perfect. But a manufacturer could say "our AEB scored X/Y on CIB in SCP". Purchasers would be
introduced to the difference between avoiding a collision during a merger, avoiding an Auffahr
collision, and avoiding an SCP collision.
Compare with the situation with emissions and fuel efficiency. Manufacturers can't just say what
they like in advertising. There is a standard set of tests, and they can use those results. The
tests can be and were gamed, as we know. But gaming manifestly has its costs. Because of the tests,
the public is regaled with details about NOx and carbon and particles and can chat about it over a
beer at the pub.
One can imagine something similar for autodriving functions. Teenagers awaiting their licence and
lusting after "performance" could chat about FCW, DBS and CIB performance on SCPs and LTAPs. Just as
today there are different licensing and age requirements for mopeds, low-power motorcycles and
general motorcycles, one could imagine they could be different classes of licence for four-wheeled
vehicles with different speed and CIB performance. You could get a licence at 15 to operate a
vehicle with validated CIB/LTAP and CIB/SCP and ..... Young Joe Smith could boast at 17 that he has
just passed his CIB/LTAP and CIB/SCP exemption test.
PBL
Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bielefeld, Germany
MoreInCommon
Je suis Charlie
Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319 www.rvs-bi.de
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