[SystemSafety] NHTSA on the Tesla crash

Dominey, Alan (UK) alan.dominey at baesystems.com
Mon Jan 23 11:23:02 CET 2017


My guess is that the lowered figure for “Failure to look properly” for van and light goods is down to two combined causal factors :

(a)  Overall higher mileage, hence greater driver experience, and

(b) Greater elevation above the road surface enabling a potentially better (And earlier) view of possible hazard situations

I would hate to seem cynical, but I will always feel that the main cause of accidents is inexperience due to parents spoiling their brats instead of making them work and save, as we had to.
I would support legislation that forced the selfish little toads to ride some form of motorcycle transport before being allowed to progress to a car, thereby removing the “I am in my safe little box” syndrome . . .

Is it just me ?

        Regards
        Alan
        Alan G. Dominey
        Senior Engineer, Product Safety
        Torpedo Capability Contract Project Surveillance Manager
        Electrical Safety SME
        Spearfish Safety Group

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From: systemsafety [mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] On Behalf Of Mike Ellims
Sent: 23 January 2017 10:13
To: 'Nick Tudor'; 'The System Safety List'
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] NHTSA on the Tesla crash


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The most common cause of traffic accidents in the UK is “Failure to look properly” which is cited as a contributing cause in 46% in 2014 of all road traffic accidents where police attended. “Failed to judge other persons speed or path” is cited in  around 24% of cases Travelling too fast for conditions was however cited in only 7% of cases. In total “Driver/Rider error or reaction” is attributed to be the primary cause in over 70% of fatal accidents.

Interestingly for van and light goods vehicles the figure for “Failure to look properly” is closer to 30%.

Data from  “Reported Road Casualties Great Britain: 2014 Annual Report”.
.
From: systemsafety [mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] On Behalf Of Nick Tudor
Sent: 23 January 2017 09:14
To: The System Safety List
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] NHTSA on the Tesla crash

I was wondering if is any data on the number of collisions/accidents that didn't happen because of human intervention?


On Mon, 23 Jan 2017 at 06:47, Peter Bernard Ladkin <ladkin at causalis.com<mailto:ladkin at causalis.com>> wrote:
On 2017-01-20 13:47 , Martyn Thomas wrote:

> All true, but if you sell it as an autopilot ...



It seems to me that there is already a chance to have things straighter for customers. NHTSA has

autodriving function classifications. There is a function called Automatic Emergency Braking, AEB.

"Automatic Emergency Braking includes the following crash avoidance technologies: Forward Collision

Warning (FCW), Dynamic Brake Support (DBS), and Crash Imminent Braking (CIB)" (Section 2, p1, of the

Tesla-crash report).



From 2007 to 2011 there was a NHTSA-sponsored project undertaken by the "Crash Avoidance Metrics

Partnership" to evaluate CIB. "The final report from this project, released in September 2011,

validated the effectiveness of radar, camera and radar/camera fusion systems as rear-end collision

mitigation or avoidance technologies. The report also identified several crash modes that were not

validated by the project, including straight crossing path (SCP) and left turn across path (LTAP)

collisions."



The Tesla crash was an SCP scenario, as far as I understand it. "Not validated" in 2011. "Validated"

in 2016? Who knows? There is an opportunity. There is a partnership, a classification of scenarios,

and a historical attempt at evaluation. Why not introduce that vocabulary and start on standardised

tests with a requirement to advertise your autodriving functions in terms of test results? It won't

be perfect. But a manufacturer could say "our AEB scored X/Y on CIB in SCP". Purchasers would be

introduced to the difference between avoiding a collision during a merger, avoiding an Auffahr

collision, and avoiding an SCP collision.



Compare with the situation with emissions and fuel efficiency. Manufacturers can't just say what

they like in advertising. There is a standard set of tests, and they can use those results. The

tests can be and were gamed, as we know. But gaming manifestly has its costs. Because of the tests,

the public is regaled with details about NOx and carbon and particles and can chat about it over a

beer at the pub.



One can imagine something similar for autodriving functions. Teenagers awaiting their licence and

lusting after "performance" could chat about FCW, DBS and CIB performance on SCPs and LTAPs. Just as

today there are different licensing and age requirements for mopeds, low-power motorcycles and

general motorcycles, one could imagine they could be different classes of licence for four-wheeled

vehicles with different speed and CIB performance. You could get a licence at 15 to operate a

vehicle with validated CIB/LTAP and CIB/SCP and ..... Young Joe Smith could boast at 17 that he has

just passed his CIB/LTAP and CIB/SCP exemption test.



PBL



Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bielefeld, Germany

MoreInCommon

Je suis Charlie

Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319  www.rvs-bi.de<http://www.rvs-bi.de>













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