[SystemSafety] Uber Advanced Technologies Group publishes its "Safety Case Framework"

Peter Bishop pgb at adelard.com
Tue Aug 6 10:12:16 CEST 2019


The long term prospects do not look that great.

- Most economic models assume continual growth

- The population is rising

The only way to fix this is to have less people who are doing less
(consuming, traveling, etc ...)

But none of this makes sense to economists and business enterprises.
Nor would it be attractive to the population in general.

Peter

On 05/08/2019 16:51, Olwen Morgan wrote:
>
>
> I think I would have expressed this as, "Let's not overestimate what
> Uber has now done ..."
>
>
> Greenland's ice cap is melting faster than ever and where are we
> putting AI effort? Into self-driving versions of the things that are
> choking the planet with CO2? ...  That's really impressive ... not.
>
> I'd be a lot more kindly disposed toward the AI community in general
> if they devoted more of their efforts to things that improve the world
> rather than provide hi-tech ways of doing the same old bad things that
> we should be phasing out anyway.
>
>
> Underwhelmed,
>
> Olwen
>
>
>
> On 29/07/2019 08:30, Martin, BJ wrote:
>>
>> Let’s not underestimate that what Uber has now done is set ‘Safety
>> Case’ and graphical notations in the automotive vernacular as a basis
>> for debate and development.
>>
>>  
>>
>> Uber have (belatedly - but without a regulator making them) set a
>> challenge for the other AV developers to be this open and structured,
>> where the rest have only written marketing material about safety
>> values in their voluntary submissions to the NHTSA. I’m not from this
>> industry but have been closely studying the
>>
>> extant and evolving safety assurance frameworks and culture for the
>> last couple of years as part for national standards and policy work.
>>
>>  
>>
>> Still a long way to go in maturing the accountability of safety in
>> design for the industry.But along with the industry collective
>> publication “Safety First in Automated Driving” from a thread a few
>> weeks back - this is the right track.
>>
>>  
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> --
>> *BJ* *Martin*
>> Safety and Certification Capability Lead
>>
>> Nova Systems
>>   
>>
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>>
>> *From:*systemsafety
>> <systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de> *On Behalf Of
>> *M A Jackson
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 23 July 2019 11:01 PM
>> *To:* systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
>> *Subject:* Re: [SystemSafety] Uber Advanced Technologies Group
>> publishes its "Safety Case Framework"
>>
>>  
>>
>> Control over the fixed infrastructure for AVs is a stronger
>> constraint than is necessary in principle.
>>
>> Design of any cyber-physical system and its proposed functions and
>> behaviours must rely on assumptions about its operating environment
>> in space and time. In principle, these assumptions must be explicitly
>> articulated and analysed, and assessed for the risk that they may not
>> hold. To give a topical illustration: the Apollo 11 designers had no
>> control over the relevant environment; but they had sufficiently
>> reliable knowledge of the relevant environmental properties and
>> behaviours that could be assumed in the small region of the solar
>> system in which the moonshot would take place.
>>
>> Cars driven by people can cope with successfully with a wide
>> environmental range—let’s call it E1. For a proposed AV design an
>> explicit statement of the assumed environment E2 (presumably a subset
>> of E1) is a sine qua non. Without this explicit statement
>> announcements like Uber’s ATG Framework have little meaning. Control
>> over the fixed infrastructure certainly makes this explicit statement
>> very much easier. Another approach is strict geofencing in a
>> specialised area. For example, a low-speed AV taxi service has been
>> provided for a retirement community occupying a gated space of a few
>> square miles, where the only road users are pedestrians, golf
>> buggies, and the AV taxis.
>>
>> — Michael Jackson
>>
>>
>>
>> > On 23 Jul 2019, at 12:32, Olwen Morgan <olwen at phaedsys.com
>> <mailto:olwen at phaedsys.com>> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On 23/07/2019 03:31, Bruce Hunter wrote:
>> >
>> > <snip>
>> >
>> > Although it misses the supporting strategy or context, it is good
>> that they have gone public with this but it needs wider scrutiny and
>> judgement against accepted standards.
>> >
>> > <snip>
>> >
>> > Uber's strategy will, IMO, be largely irrelevant because they do
>> not control the fixed infrastructure in which their AVs will run.
>> Railways have a dedicated infrastructure for trains and aviation has
>> dedicated infrastructures for both civil and military flight. AV's
>> will not be using a dedicated infrastructure and they will be trying
>> to shoe-horn safety into environmental constraints that their
>> designers had no part in setting.
>> >
>> > I'm expecting AVs to work safely only where a such infrastructure
>> can be provided, e.g. inter-terminal shuttles at airports or
>> physically separate dedicated lanes on public roads. IMO no amount of
>> in-vehicle technology is going to compensate for hazards arising from
>> the existing design of non-dedicated infrastructure. The likely
>> result, I suspect, will be a series of accidents before people
>> realise that the lack of dedicated infrastructure is the critical
>> problem.
>> >
>> >
>> > Olwen
>> >
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
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