[SystemSafety] State of the art for "safe Linux"

[Dewi Daniels]

On Wed, 7 Aug 2024 at 12:12, Prof. Dr. Peter Bernard Ladkin <
ladkin at causalis.com> wrote:

> On 2024-08-07 11:38 , Paul Sherwood wrote:
> > On 2024-08-07 10:28, Prof. Dr. Peter Bernard Ladkin wrote:
> >>>> [Dewi Daniels] If
> >>>> your tests haven't achieved statement coverage, then there's code that
> >>>> you've never executed, not even once, during your testing.
> >>>
> >>> I understand the argument, but this last sentence is flawed.
> >>
> >> How is the last sentence "flawed"? It seems to me a clear statement of
> the obvious (which I
> >> imagine is what Dewi intended).
> >
> > Because we can **test**, without creating **tests**. We may have
> executed the code, but not
> > created tests for it.
>
> Let me rephrase. Dewi's statement above is a tautology.
>
> I imagine he made it in order to remind us of the importance of statement
> coverage in constructing
> tests of critical software.
>

Yes, that is exactly what I meant. I was stating the obvious.

In reply to Paul, "testing" is not the same thing as "executing".  Steve
explained very eloquently why you can't just rely on the millions of Linux
users to "test" the code.

Yours,
Dewi
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